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THE REPLEVIN ACT OF 1901
(Continued from the April Issue)
CHAPTER V.
PLAINTIFF'S DECLARATION IN REPLEVIN
Section 42. After the writ has been properly served
and the goods replevied by the sheriff, the plaintiff under
the fourth section of -the Act of 1901 must file his declaration,' as under the old practice, but not as under the "Statement" Act of 1887.' As there is no time designated in the
act during which the plaintiff "shall file a declaration," it
would appear that the prior practice would prevail, in which
the plaintiff was allowed one year from the return day of
the writ in which to file his declaration,4 even in distress
proceedings or rent.'
Section 43. The form of the declaration under the
fourth section of the Act of 1901 is different from the old
declaration in that it must be "verified by oath, Which shall
'Berger v. Berger, 19 Dist. 427; Cf. 3 Lehigh L. J. 183.
2
Comm. v. Schroeder; Supra-Chap. 1-Note 1.
SGames v. Gilder; Supra-Chapt. 1-Note 4.
4
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Hackett, 7 W. N. C. 45 (1879). Contra:
Ott v. Miller, Supra-Chapt. 1-Note 3. Lumber Co. v. McCormick, 28 County 398 (1903).
"Gamble v. Greaves, 7 Phila. 433 (1869).
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consist of a concise statement of his demand, setting forth
the facts upon which his title to the goods and chattels ds
based," that -is:6

"A plaintiff in replevin must now do more than simply
declare 'this is my property' if he expects to recover. He
must prima facie, demonstrate the correctness of that legal
conclusion by a statement of facts that would bear the deduction of such a legal conclusion and these facts must be
stated in a traversible form," and if he fails to do this,
even if there be obtained a judgment for want of an affidavit of defense, such judgment will be stricken off.8
Section 44. Accordingly a bare transcript is -not a
sufficient declaration" in replevin proceedings. 9
Section 45. "It is not necessary for the plaintiff in
replevin to anticipate in his statement of claim the defense
which may be set up and traverse it. All that the plaintiff
is required to do is to set forth fully his title with an averment of wrongful dispossession."' 10
Section 46. A declaration in replevin need not contain
an averment as to the value of the goods and chattels replevied."
Section 47. There need be no specific averment of
damages in the declaration 1 2 even if there be "outrage"
or "oppression."' 3 But consequential damages not necessarily or maturally resulting from the tortious act must be
specifically alleged.1
6Games

v. Gilder, Supra-Note 3.

Heisley v. Tool Co., 33 Sup.

218 (1907).
7McConnell, J. in Davis v. Nipple, 22 Dist.
Forsyth v. Stumbaugh, 13 Dist. 339 (1904).

8

Cf. 29 County 476.

1043 (1913).
Cf. 8 Dauphin 175

Hall v. Irvine, 23 Dist. 968 (1914).

Compare un-

der the old practice Lewis v. Browning, 32 County 284 (1905).
9
Gamble v. Greaves, Supra-Note 5. This case may also be

cited as an authority to allow the Municipal Court of Philadelphia
County to have jurisdiction in replevin proceedings.
lOHeisley v. Tool Co., Supra-Note 6.
"Krumbhaar v. Stetler, Supra-Chapt. 2-Note 61.

12Gibbs v. Bartlett, Supra-Chapt 2-Note 27.
"3Schofield v. Ferrers, Supra-Chapt. 2-Note 61.
241d.
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,Section 48.

The declaration being duly filed of recserve a copy of the same on the admust
plaintiff
ord, the
within forty-eight hours, as
attorney
or
his
verse party
a nullity.15 And such seras
treated
otherwise it may -be
vice has been interpreted to mean actual personal service
since the "Service Act" of 1901 was held not to apply to
declarations in replevin; 1 6 But the later authoriti'es hold
that the practice is analagous to the "Procedure Act" of
1887 where the "Service Act" of 1901 does apply, finding
fault with the reasoning "why there should be a higher or
in
more particular mode of service of plaintiff's statement
17
replevn than in the service of the writ itself."'
Section 49. By the fifth section of the Act of 1901, it
is provided that after the declaration has been filed, the
paintiff may enter a common appearance if the defendant,
though duly summoned, fails to enter his appearance at
the return day of the writ.-"
Section 50. Similar to other actions where a declaration or statement of claim is to be filed, "the defendant or
parity intervening may enter a rule upon the plaintiff to file
such declaration within fifteen days and the plaintiff failing so to do, judgment of non-pros shall be entered. And
the Courts of -Common Pleas have elaborated this to mean
that the defendant must enter such rule in all eases before
he can obtain a judgment of non-pros,' 9 notwithstanding
the fact that the act, merely refers to the fifteen -days and
uses the word "may" instead of "shall."
Section 51. The fifteen days time is computed as follows :-"The day on which a rule is taken or the decision
made, is exaluded; if one or more Sundays occur within the
time, they are counted unless where the last day shall fall
on a Sunday in which case, the law does not allow the act
' 5 Philadelphia County Rule of Court No. 74.
' 8 Smith v. Smith, 17 Dist. 380. Cf. 13 Luz. Leg. Jur. 413 (1907).
17Hoyt v. Carson, 22 Dist. 1039 (1913)..
'lLynd v. Benjamin, Supra--Chapt. 3-Note 14.
19
tt v. Miller, Supra-Chapt. 1-Note 3. Lumber Co. v. McCormick, Supra-Note 4.
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to be done; but it may be done the next day,"' 20 and in leap
year the 29th day of February is always counted as a day.21
Section 52. Whether the judgment of non-pros is selfoperating or not is not clearly set forth -inthe Act of 1901.
But under a local rule of court in Delaware County, it has
been held that the judgment of non-ptos can only be entered upon motion of the defendant, as otherwise the plaintiff could still pursue his legal rights.22
Section 53. The judgment of non-pros, 23 or a judgment on a demurrer, 24 merely determines that the title to
the goods and chattels in question belong to the defendant
,a writ of retorno haand upon the entry of such judgment,
25
same.
the
for
issued
be
may
bendo
,Section 54. The damage under a judgment of nonpros or under a judgment on a demurrer can only be ascertained by a writ of inquiry.28
CHAPTER VI.
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE
Section 55. Within fifteen days after the service of
the declaration upon the defendant or his attorney, he, or
the intervenor must file ,an affidavit of defense,' The Act
of 1901 does not expressly say that the plaintiff must give
the defendant notice to file an affidavit of defense 'within
fifteen days, yet it has been decided that such notice to the
defendant is essential ; 2 and such notice "must be construed
20

Harker v. Addis, 4 Pa. 515 (1846).

21

Id.

22

Cochrane v. Nolan, 23 Dist. 458 (1914).

23

Hoffner v. Reed, 3 Grant 245 (1819). Westinghouse Co. v.
237 Pa. 203 (1912).
Harris,
24
Easton v. Worthington, 5 S. & R. 310. McCabe v. Morehead,
1 W.25& S. 513 (1841). Harker v. Addis, Supra-Note 20.
1offner v. Reed, Supra-Note 23. Harker v. Addis, SupraNote 20.
26

Wildower v. D6dson, 23 Dist. 418 (1914).

22 Sup. 603.

Painter v. Snyder,

Westinghouse v. Harris, Supra-Note 23.

'Greasmer v. Hill, 235 Pa. 545 (1909).
2
Wildower v. Dodson, Supra-Chapt. 5-Note 26.
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to be notice after the statement has been filed." 3
It is
questionable whether such practice, in the absence of any
express rules of court, would be adopted by the appellate
courts, because the affidavit of defense in replevin, being
entirely a statutory creation, and unknown to the prior
law, cannot acquire any attributes foreign to such creative
enuactment-qualities not expressly enumerated within its
provisions. Therefore, since the Act of 1901 does not require a plaintiff in express terms "to rule the defendant to
file an affidavit of defense within fifteen days," the court
is proceeding beyond the confines of such statute when it
attempts to place upon it such a construction.
Section 56. If no affidavit of defense be filed within
fifteen days, then the plaintiff can obtain judgment for
want of such pleading, even before the return day of the
writ.4 But if no judgment is entered, then the affidavit of
defense can be filed after the fifteen days.5
Section 57. Though the Act of 1901 requires a declaration and an affidavit of defense in replevin, it is not simliar to 'an action in "assumpsit."0 1 "Yet the sufficiency of
such an -affidavit must be determined by the same rules that
7
control in other actions where like affidavits are required."
but not with the same scrutiny as in an affidavit of defense in assumpsit.8 "It must state, frankly and fairly,
facts that support the elpim advanced, not legal conclusions
or mere inferences drawn by affiant."
The setting up of
facts without specifically denying the plaintiff's title is sufficient,"0 so it neeed not set forth a chain of title," though
it is absolutely essential that the defendant's own title be
3Id.

4

Greasmer v. Hill, supra-Note 1.

5
Miller
6

v. Jackson, 34 Sup. 31 (1907).
VanSciver v. Churchhill, 16 Dist. 363 (1907).
7
Miller v. Jackson, Supra-Note 5.
8

Fox v. Magaw, Supra-Chapt. 2-Note 53.
Miller v. Jackson, Supra-Note 5.
lOMarks v. Pratt, 9 Del. Co. 365 (1904).
"Lehman v. Gill, Supra-Chapt. 4-Note 2.
9
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shown,1" especially when the title was originally in the plaintiff. 3 In general "the burden is placed upon him (the defend ant) of showing either that the ownership set up by the
plaintiff does not exist or that if the plaintiff be the owner,
that he is, nevertheless, not entitled to possession by reason
of a lien or other facts sufficient to justify defendant's
possession.""4
,Section 58.

A set off is not permissible in replevin.'"

Section 59. The court may enter judgment for want
of a sufficient affidavit of defense which determines the
question of title to the goods and chattels involved and noth-ing else. 16 Thus a judgment cannot be entered for monetary damages.' 7 And judgment may be entered for such
"goods and chattels as may be ,admitted to be the propertof the plaintiff in the affidavti of defense," or, "for such
goods and chattels to which the court may adjudge the affidavit of defense insufficient ;" the judgment thus entered
is general."8
,Section 60. The fifth section of the Act of 1901 further provides for a writ of retorno habendo where the judgment is rendered "for a portion of such goods and chattels"
only, but is silent as to a case where a judgment is rendered
for all the goods and chattels and, is so criticized by Landis, J., in Patch Mfg. Co. v. Killinger. For such, a contingency we must look to the seventh section of the act for
assistance. 20 And the writ of retorno habendo is not restricted to a judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of
1 2Miller v. Jackson, Supra-Chapt. 4-Note 2.

1SAmerican Soda Fountain Co. v. Egbert, 14 Dist. 426 (1905).
4
' National Cash Reg. Co. v. Ryder, 22 Dist. 119 (1913).
"Safe Co. v. Walenk, 42 Sup. 576. Wagner v. Prettyman, 53
Sup. 316 (1913). Liveright v. Thornton, 56 Sup. 611 (1914).
' 6 Greasmer v Hll, Supra-Note 1. Westinghouse Co. v. Harris, Supra-Chapt. 5-Note 23.
17 Wildower v. Dodson, Supra-Chapt. 5--Note 26.

'-Patch Mfg. Co. v. Killinger, 12 Dist. 6.
19 Lanc. 101.

Cf. 8 North 197. Cf.

19Patch MIfg. Co. v. Killinger, Supra-Note 18.

20d.
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defense, as it may apply equally as well to a judgment rendered under a jury verdlet.21
Section 61. Where judgment is obtained for want of
an affidavit of defense in replevin, the assessment of damages can only be ascertained by a writ of inquiry,2 an
adoption in this respect by the Act of 1901 of the then established practice."2
CHAPTER VII.
JUDGMENT AND EXECUTION IN REPLEVIN
Section 62. While the Act of 1901 speaks of a declaration and an affidavit of defense, it is not similar to an
action in assumpsit. But the rules governing the legal import of these plead.ings are similar,' save that in replevin
we deal with the individual pieces of the goods and chattels as units,2 whereas in assumpsit we deal in units of the
established monetary standard.
Section 63. By the sixth section of the Act of 1901,
the declaration and affidavit of defense are the only pleadings filed to bring the same at issue,2 even in distress pro..
So no question of fact can be raised
ceedings for rent.'
prior to the filing of the declaration ;' and a local rule of
court in Philadelphia County requiring a "reply" from the
plaintiff to defendant's affidavit of defense has no application in a replevin action. 6
Section 64. The same section further provides that
21

Reber v. Schroeder, Supra-Chapt. 1-Note 6.

22

Wildower v. Dodson ,Supra-Chapt. 5--Note 26.
23Baird v. Porter, Supra-Chapt. 2-Note 34.
'Miller v. Jackson, Supra-Chapt. 6-Note 5.
WanSciver v. Churchhill, Supra-Chapt. 6-Note 6.
3Forsyth v. Stumbaugh, Supra-Chapt. 5--Note 8.
Herbst, 23 Dist. (1914).

Note 56.

Berger v. Berger, Supra-Chapt. 5-Note 1.

v. McDonald, Supra-Chapt. 2-Note 57.
4

Drumgoole v. Lyle, Supra-Chapt. 5-Note 1.
v. Berger, Supra-Chapt. 5--Note 1.
Kurtz v. Herbst, Supra-Note 3.

5
Berger
6

Kurtz v.

Williams v. Williams, Supra-Chapt. 2-

McDonald
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the only issue to be determined by a jury d's "the question
of the title of or right of possession of the goods and chattels as between the parties."17 Therefore, it is not necessary for the jury to -assess pecuniary damages in its verdict,8 except as provided for, in the seventh section of the
act, '"ff the title to the said goods and chattels be found
finally to be in a party who has not been given possession
of the same." 9 It should be noted that in the sixth section
of the act we have the complete phrase "title to or right of
possession," the whole of which is embraced by the siAgle
word "title" as used in all other sections of this act."
,Section 65. "The issue in replevin is not as to the
ownership of the property but as to the improper detention
thereof in addition"" depending upon the facts of the particular case. Therefore, the verdict must be for each specific chattel," and a double verdict is permissible," as in
the original pr.actice,' 4 in vWthich the costs are assessed on
each side.' 5
Section 66. The jury may assess damages for the detention beyond the value of the property,'0 and may award
"exemplary" damages in certain cases where there is "outrage or oppression,"' 7 though such "outrage" or "oppression" need not be averred in the declaration. 8 But conse7Similar to the old practice. Cassidy v. Elias, 90 Pa. 434 (1879).
"Reber v. Schroeder, Supra-Chapt. 1-Note 6.
9
Compare Reber v. Schroeder, Supra-Chapt. 1-Note 6.
'OHoughton Mifflin Co. v. DuBell, Supra-Chapt. 2-Note 41.
"Bregy, J. in VanSciver v. Churchhill, Supra-Chapt. 6-Note

6.

1"Id.
"sId.

14 Wright v. Frank, 94 Pa. 26 (1880).

Shoemaker v. Shoemaker,

4 D. R. 398.
"5Shoemaker v.

Shoemake",

Supra-Note

14.

Compare Ber-

tram v. Petrofsky, 23 Dist. 402 (1914). Klein v. Blaine, 18 Dist.
852 (1909).
16Warner v. Augenbaugh, Supra-Chapt. 2-Note 69.
17Cox v. Burdett, Supta-Chapt. 2-Note 68.
"8Schofield v. Ferrers, Supra-Chapt. 2-Note 61.
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quential damages not necessarily or naturally resulting from
the tortious act must be specially aleged. 19
Section 67. The court can hold a jury's verdict, 20 and,
under the sixth section of the Act may enter a conditional
verdict, enforcing it in accordance with equitable principles
"if any party be found to have only a lien upon said goods
and chattels." It is a query whether this is the sole, single
instance in which a conditional verdict, enforced in accordance with equitable principles, may be entered.2
Section 68. Either party may move for judgment non
obstante veredicto in replevin 2 the same as under the earlier practice.2 3
Section 69. The seventh section of the Act of 1901,
provides, -that upon a successful conclusion, either party
may -issue -a writ of retorno habendo, originally the exclusive right of the defendant-24 But this does not apply to a
"lienor" as he is restricted under -the prior section of the
act to his conditional verdict to be enforced by the court in
accordance with equitable pr.inciples."
Section 70. The mere issuance of the writ of retorno
habendo does not vest title in the goods and chattels until
-it
is finally executed. 2 6 And in the execution of this writ,
the sheriff can call upon the successful party for his assis27
tance to identify the property in question.
Section 71. By the same section of the act either
party can select in the first instance, one of several remedies, but each is a distinct remedy, separate and apart, from
19Id.
20Easton
v. Worthington, Supra-Chapt. 5-Note 24. Cox v.
Burdett, Supra-Chapt. 2-Note 68. Houghton Mifflin Co. v. DuBell, 2Supra-Note 10.
-Shorley v. Hub Machine Co., iSupra-Chapt. 2-Note 50.
22Beatty v. Leddy, 17 Dist. 765 (1907).
23

Cassidy v. Elias, Supra-Note 7.

24Williams v. Smith, 10 S. & R. 102 (1823)

25Shorley v. Hub Machine Co., Supra-Chapt. 2-Note 50. (See
Section 67 Supra).
26Shell v. Hummell, I Pears. 19 (1853).
27

Ruch v. Morris, Supra-Chapt. 2-Note 19.
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the others. 8 Under the prior practice, the defendant could
niot proceed in the first instance with anyone of the alternate remedies, but 'had to resort exclusively "to his common
law judgment, and sue out his writ of pro retorno haben-

o.I"

29

Section 72. The writ of retorno habendo may contain
"an added clause of fieri faci;a;s as to the damages awarded
and costs" as under the earlier practice; 3 0 or, in the first
instance, he may issue execution for the value thereof and
the damages awarded and costs by fieri facias as under the
old practice, 3 ' which execution, however, similar to distress proceedings,3 2- does not relieve the -surety from the full
obligation of the 'bond;38 or by capias ad satisfaciendum,'
though the proceedings cannot commence with the issuance
of a capias ad respondendum, since replevd'n is an action in
rem, in the beginning.1
Section 73. "He may sue in the first instance upon
the bond given and recover thereon the value of the goods
and chattels, damages and costs in the same manner that
recovery is bad upon other official bonds." 3 6 And if suit is
brought on the bond or counter bond, judgment may be entered for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense thereto,3 7 as this action is ex contractu. A set-off may be pleadcd, though this could not be done in the replevin action it28

Shell v. Hummell, Supra-Chapt. 2-Note 47.
Williams v. Smith, Supra-Note 24.
302 Brightly's Troubat and Haley's Prac.
3
S Williams v. Smith, Supra-Note 24.
32
Krumbhaar v. Stetler, Supra-Chapt. 2-Note 61.
3
3Shell v. Hummell, Supra-Chapt. 2-Note 47.
34
Williams v. Smith, Supra-Note 24. List v. Furth, 15 W. N. C.
548 (1885). Note-The Fi. fa. is usually issued first and must be
completely executed and consummated before a Ca. Sa. can issue. Burk
v. McFall, 2 Browne 143 (1812).
35
List v. Furth, Supra-Note 34.
36
See ante sections 13 to 18 inclusive for the interpretation of the
Replevin Bond.
370il Co. v. Terry, 16 Sup. 337 (1901).
29
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self. 3 Yet curiously enough, it has been decided that an
appeal bond in replevin is not an action ex contractu.3 9
Section 74. Section ten of the Act of 1901 lijnits the
actions on bonds to five years -afterthe determination of the
§uit, apparently modifying the prior practice where such
action was permitted six years after the determination of
the original suit.4 °
Section 75. No exemption is allowed in replevin, 4
this being true also under the prior practice. 2 So conversely, where the defendant's exemption was refused in an action of assumpsit, he could not maintain replevin for the
goods and chattels, appropriated by him under such claim
43
for exemption.

APPENDIX
The Replevin Act of April 19, 1901-P. L. 88
Section 1
"BE IT ENACTED, &c., that before any writ of replevin shall be issued out of any Court of this Commonwealth, the person applying for said writ shall execute and
file with the Prothonotary of the said Court, a bond to
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for the use of the parties i-nterested, with security in double the value of the
goods sought to be replevied, conditioned, that if the plaintiff or plaintiffs fail to maintain their title to such goods
38

Balsely v. Hoffman, Supra-Chapt. 1-Note 12. Comm. v.
King, Supra-Chapt. 4-Note 3.
39
Randall v. Seybert, 14 Dist. 247 (1905). It is difficult to conceive why the replevin bond or claim property bond should be considered as a matter of contract, when the appeal bond wihch is further
remote still continues to retain the original replevin attributes? And
yet Comm. v. King and Randall v. Seybert were both decided by the
same Judge.
40

Clark v. Morss, Supra-Chapt. 2-Note 73.

4 1 Randall

v. Seybert, Supra-Note 39.
42Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, Supra-Note 14.
4 3Bonsall v. Comly, 44 Pa. 442 (1863).

DICKINSON

LAW

REVIEW

or chattels, he or they, shall pay to the parties thereunto
entitled, the value of said goods and chattels, and Al legal
costs, fees and damages which the defendants or other
person to 'whom such goods or chattels so replevied belong, may sustain by reason of the issuance of -such Writ
of Replevin."
Section II.
"If any other person than the defendant named in
the writ be found in possession of the goods and chattels,
he shall be duly served with the writ and his name added
as a party defendant to the case. The writ shall command the sheriff to serve the party in possession, as well
as the defendant named."
Section III.
"The Court, (or in vacation time, a judge thereof
at chambers) *, may grant leave to any person, upon affidavit filed that the goods and chattels so replevied, belong to him, to intervene as a party defendant in such
suit; and the defendant or party so intervening may file
a counter bond within seventy-two hours after such goods
or chattels have been replevied, during which time, the
said goods and chattels ;shall reman in the possession of
the sheriff and which time may be extended by the Court
(or in vacation time a judge thereof at chambers) * upon
cause shown. Such counter bond shall be given to the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for the use of the parties
interested, in the same amount as the original bond and
Where several parties claim the
with like conditions.
right to give a counter bond and have possesson of said
goods and chattels, the parity who is in actual or constructive possession of the goods and chattels at the time
the writ of replevin was served, shall, upon entering the
proper counter bond, be entitled to have said goods 'and
chattels."
*Words in parenthesis amended by the Act of March
19, 1903, P. L. 39.

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

213

Act of April 14, 1905, P. L. 163 -adds three new clauses as follows:"Provided, That in any action of replevin hereafter to
be brought where the defendant or person intervening in
such action, claiming title to the property replevied, shall
enter a claim property bond therefor, if the plaintiff
within seventy-two hours after such notice from the sheriff
of the entry of such claim property bond, by affidavit
filed in such action, aver that by reason of the nature of
such property, or of -any special circumstances connected
with his alleged ownership thereof, the actual pecuniary
value of such property will not compensate him for the
loss thereof, the Court, or in vacation time any judge
thereof at chambers, shall order such property to be impounded in the custody of the sheriff or such other persons
as the Court, or in vacation time, any judge thereof at
chambers, may designate to abide -the final determination
of the -action, provided, the plaintiff shall exhibit an estimate of the probable necessary charges and expenses of
the storage, care or keep of such property pending the
final determination of such action and shall pay, or secure
the payment of, such charges and expenses as the court,
or in vacation time, any judge thereof at chambers shall
approve.
"The amount of such security shall be fixed by the
court, or in vacation time, by any judge thereof at chambers, and said security shall be approved in the same
maner as now provided for the approval of security
entered by the plaintiff on the issuing of the writ of replevin. The bond shall be to the Commonwealth and shall
be for the use of any party interested in the payment of
the storage, care or keep of the impounded property.
"Upon the final determination of such -action, the
property so impounded shall be delivered to the party who
shall have successfully maintained his title thereof, and
the charges and expenses of the storage, keep or care of
such property shal] be assessed as costs of suit, and shall
be recoverable from the unsuccessful party in the same
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manner as damages and costs are now recoverable in an
action of replevin."
Section IV.
"The plaintiff in such action shall file a declaration,
verified by oath, which shall consist of a concise statement of his demand, setting forth the facts upon which
his title to the goods and the chattels is based. The defendant or party intervening may enter a rule upon the
plaintiff to file such declaration within fifteen days and
the plaintiff failing so to do, a judgment of non pros shall
be entered, which judgment shadl operate to forfeit said
bond.
.Sectiom V.
"The defendant or party intierlvening shall, within
fifteen days after the filing of such declaration, file an
affidavit of defense thereto, setting up the acts denying
the plaintiff's title and showing his own title to said goods
and chattels; and in event of his failure to do so, upon
proof that a copy of said declaration was served upon him
or his attorney, judgment may be entered for the -plaintiff
and 'against the defendant or party intervening, which
judgment shall operate to forfeit any counter bond given
by him. The Court may enter judgment, with like effect, for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense,
or for such goods and chattels as may be -admitted to be
the property of the plaintiff in the affidavit of defense,
and may enter judgment with like effect, for such goods
and chattels as to which the court may adjudge the affidavit of defense insufficient. And in the event of judgment being rendered in favor of the plaitiff for a portion
of such goods and chattels, repievied, he may proceed to
recover such goods and chattels by writ of retorno habendo,
or the value thereof after assessment of damages on a writ
of inquiry of damages issued, and the case shall be proceeded in for the recovery of the balance. If the defendant has been duly summoned and does not appear at the
return day of the writ, the plaintiff, having filed his de-
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clarat'on, may file a common appearance for the defendant and proceed in the cause as in other cases."
Section VI.
"The declaration and -affidavit of defense as originally (filed, or -as amended by leave of court, shall constitute
the issue under which, without other pleadings, the question of the title to, or right of possession of, the goods
and chatte.s as between the parties shall be determined by
a jury. If any party be found to 'have only a lien upon
the said goods 'and chattels, a-eonditional verdict may be
entered, which the Court 'shall enforce in -accordance with
equitable principles."
Section VII.
"If the title to the said goods and chattels be found
finally to be in a party who has mot given possession of
the same in said proceeding, the jury shall determine the
value thereof to -the successful party, and he may, at his
option, issue a writ in the nature of a writ of retorno ha.bendo, requiring the delivery thereof to him, with -an added clause of fieri facias as to the damages awarded and
costs, and upon failure so to recover them, or in the first
instance, he may issue execution for the value thereof and
the damages awarded and costs; or, -he may sue, in the
first instance, upon .the bond given, and recover thereon
the value of the goods and chattels, damages and costs,
in the same manner that recovery is had upon other official bonds."
Section VIII.
"The prothonotary shall, in the first instance, file the
amount of bail, and approve or reject the security offered; his action in either regard shall be subject to revision
by the Court. In order to determine the amount of bail,
the plaintiff shall make an affidavit of value of the goods
and chattels, which value shall be the costs to the defendant of replacing them, should the issue be decided in his
favor. The Court may, upon motion, increase the amount
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of bail required; may require new bail, if, for any reason, the old bail, has -become insufficient, and may enter
a non pros against the party in default, ,ifhe has the
goods and chattels and its orders be not complied with, or
may permit the substitution of bail Tor -thatalready given
and enter an exoneration on the bail bond."
Section IX.
"Alias nd pluries writs of replevin may be issued
if the goods and chattels be not taken or all the defendants
named be not served, and the cause may proceed against
the defendant in fact served, though the goods and chattels be not found."
Section X.
"No action shall be brought upon any bond given in
accordance with the provisions of this act, unless commenced within five years after the final determination of
the suit in which the bond was given."
Scetion XI.
"This act shall not apply to any actions brought before -he date thereof."
Section XII.
"The Courts of Common Pleas may make general
rules governing the proceedings under this act, not inconsistent 'herewith."
Section XIII.
"All acts or parts of 'acts inconsistent herewith be and
the same are hereby repeaJed."
A. E. HURSHMAN,
Philadelphia.
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH v. STOKES
Murder-Dying DecIarations--Admissibility of Proof That Declarant was an Atheist; That His Reputation For Veracity Was
Bad
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Stokes was tried for the murder of Holloway. Holloway's dying declaration was received. The defendant, in order to learn the
credit to be given to the declaration, offered, first, to prove that
Holloway was an atheist and did not believe in punishment for falsehood either before or after death; secondly to show -that his reputation for veracity was bad. The court excluded the evidence and
Stokes was convicted. Motion for a new trial.
Farrell for plaintiff.
Hollis for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GILLESPIE, J. In this case -the court is asked to grant a new
trial on the following grounds: First, the court erred in admitting
the dying declaration of Holloway; spcond, that the learned court
erred in excluding the evidence offered by defendant -that Holloway
was an atheist and did not believe in punishment for falsehood, either
before or after death; and, third, that the court also erred in excluding the evidence offered by defendant that Holloway's reputation for veracity was bad.
In this case it is a serious question whether or not the dying
declaration is admissible. Upon this question there is quite a conflict of authority.
In Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463, affirmed in 26 N. J.
L. 601, it was held that dying declarations are not admissible in
evidence if the person making them has no belief in a God and a
future state of rewards and punishments; but the law will presume
such belief until the contrary is proved. The objection goes to the
competency, not to the credibility, of the testimony.
To the same effect is the case of Brown v. State, 78 Miss. 637,
29 Southern 519. Dying declarations must not only be made under
a sense of impending dissolution, but the declarant must also feel
his "accountability to his Maker and the deep impression that he
is soon to render Him final account." 1 Greenleaf's Evidence, Sec.
157. Christian theological belief is material to the admissibility
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of a dying statement. 2 Wigmore's Evidence, Sec. 1443, page 1810.
The foregoing would indicate that the dying declaration of a person, who had no religious belief or who did not believe in a future
state of rewards and punishments, was not admissible as evidence.
But in this we do not concur.
The rule as to the dying declaration of a person who does not
believe in a God and a future state of rewards, seems to be the same
as would admit or reject the testimony of a living witness. If the
declarant by reason of a disbelief in a future state of accountability would have been excluded as a witness while living his dying
declaration would, for like cause, be rejected by the court. Lambeth v. State, 23 Miss. 413. We must then decide whether by the
Laws of Pennsylvania, Holloway would be competent as a witness,
if living. Here again is a difference of opinion.
In Commonwealth v. Winnemore, 2 Brewster. 378, it was held
that a witness to be competent to testify must believe in a Supreme
Being and possess a conscience alive to the conviction of accountability to a higher power than human law. It is not enough that he
may feel bound to tell the truth for the good of society, or through
fear of punishment if he testify falsely. Hence atheists and infidels,
professing no religion at all, are incompetent as witnesses. To the
same effect is Cubbison v. McCreary, 2 W. & S. 262, in which Sergeant, J., declares, that "the true test of witness' competency on
the ground of his religious principles is whether he believes in the
existence of a God who will punish him if he swear falsely." According to these decisions Holloway would not be a competent witness, and therefore, his dying declaration would not be admissible.
But in this we cannot concur. By the common law of England
the want of belief in a God and in rewards and punishment after
death makes a witness incompetent, mainly on the principle that one
who does not have such religious faith will not consider himself
bound by an oath. The old rule prevailed when the government
adopted and cruelly enforced one religion as the only true one. In
America where the church and state are separate and religious freedom dominates such a rule cannot and ought not to live. When the
reason for the rule ceases the law ceases. It is entirely against the
spirit and letter of American Constitutional Law.
The Constitution of Pennsylvania. 1874. Art. 1, Sec. 3. reads:
"All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can,
of right, be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent; no human
authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the
rights of conscience, and no preference shall be given by law, to
any religious establishments or modes of worship."
By the Act of 1887, P. L. 158, all persons were made compe-
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tent witnesses except upon conviction of perjury. This seems to
have removed all incompetency arising from lack of religious belief. In Blair v. Seaver, 29 Pa. 274, it was held that a belief
in a future state of rewards and punishments is not essential
to the competency of a witness, nor is it cause of exclusion that he
does not believe in the inspired character of the Bible.
The Act of 1909, P. L. 140, declares in Sec. 2: "Hereafter the
capacity of any person to testify in any judicial proceeding shall
be in no wise affected by his opinion on matters of religion." In
California no person is to be held incompetent to be a witness on
account of his religious belief. This rule applies to dying declarations. People v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29. It seems, therefore, that this
Act specifically overrules the old time decisions of Com. v. Winnemore and Cubbison v. McCreary.
Since in most of our States at present time, belief in a God
and in a future state is not necessary to the competency of a witness, the dying declarations of a person are admitted in evidence
altho he is a disbeliever in a God and in a future state. Therefore,
the learned court did not err in admitting Holloway's deelaration.
The second ground assigned for a new trial is the exclusion of
the evidence that Holloway was an atheist and did not believe in
punishment for falsehood either before or after death.
Evidence to the effect that the person who made a dying declaration was devoid of religious beliefs is admissible for the purpose
of discrediting the dying declaration, it being for the jury to say
to what extent such evidence affects the value of the declaration.
To render such evidence admissible it is not necessary to show that
the deceased was a non-believer at or near the time he made the
dying declaration. The defense may show deceased was a nonbeliever at any time during his life, it being for the jury to determine whether he had changed his opinion at the' time of making
the declaration and the effect thereof. To this effect are the following cases: Nesbit v. State, 43 Ga. 238; Hill v. State, 64 Miss.
431; Gambrell v. State, 92 Miss. 728.
In Goodall v. State, 1 Ore. 333, 80 Am. Dec. 396, Boise, J., said
"I am of the opinion that such evidence should have been admitted,
for this belief and the anticipation of future retribution is the only
sanction of such declarations. It is supposed that one impressed with
the fears of immediate impending dissolution, and believing that he
will soon be called to answer for the truth of his statements to his
final Judge, will be under restraint against falsehood sufficient to
make the admission of such evidence safe and generally contribute
te the ends of justice. But when the deceased was a disbeliever, and
consequently under no apprehension of future punishment for his
falsehood, it is reasonable to believe that, however much he may be
impressed with the fear of immediate and certain death, he would
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not be under such strong influence to make a -true statement of the
facts as one impressed with the belief of future accountability."
Where the dying declaration of the deceased had been admitted in evidence and the defendant when he came to make out his defense offered to prove that the deceased was a materialist, and believed in no God or future conscious existence, it was held error for
the Court to reject such offer and exclude the evidence. State v.
Elliott, 45 Iowa 486. In the face of these cases we are agreed that
this is not the law in Pennsylvania, and would not be so held.
The Act of 1909, P. L. 140, Sec. 3, declares "no witness shall be
questioned, in any judicial proceeding, concerning his religious belief; nor shall any evidence be heard upon the subject for the
purpose of affecting either his competency or credibility." The
question now arises whether the dying declaration of the man comes
within the limits of this Act. The Act specifically states "witness." According to the case of Lambeth v. State, 23 Miss. 413, if
a witness while living would have been excluded, his dying declaration would, for like cause, be rejected by the court.
Let us suppose that Holloway had not died; and had been placed
on the stand as a witness to testify to the very things which he
testified to in his declaration. As a living witness under the Act
of 1909, the defendant would not have been allowed to offer evidence concerning his religious belief, for the purpose of affecting
either his competency or credibility as a witness. Why then should
the defendant 'be allowed to attack his dying declaration?
In People v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29, it was held that no witness
should be incompetent on account of his religious belief and that this
rule applies as well to dying declarations.
Therefore, the learned court did not err in excluding the evidence
of the defendant, that Holloway was an atheist and did not believe
in punishment for falsehood, either before or after death.
The third ground on which error was assigned is the exclusion
of the defendant's offer of evidence to show that Holloway's reputation for veracity was bad.
Dying declarations may be impeached by showing that the
general reputation of the deceased for truth and veracity in the
community in wihch he lived was bad and that he could not be believed under oath. State v. Reed, 250 Mo. 379,-157 S. W. 316; Lester v. State, 37 Fla. 382; 20 Southern 232; Reed v. State, 99 Ga.
210; 25 S. E. 268. According to these decisions the learned court
erred in excluding the defendant's offer of evidence on this point.
Where the facts of the case are such, that the appellate court cannot say that, if such evidence had been admitted, the jury would
have returned the same verdict, the exclusion of such evidence will
be held to be reversible error.
The third assignment is sustained and new trial awarded.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The court below in a very learned opinion has awarded a new
trial. No error can be assigned, in an appellate court to this act,
and for this reason, the appeal must be dismissed.
The Act of April 23d, 1909, P. L. 14.0, directs that "hereafter the
capacity of any person to testify in any judicial proceeding shall be
in no wise affected by his opinions on matters of religion. No witness shall be questioned, in any judicial proceeding concerning. his
religious belief, nor shall any evidence be heard upon the subject,
for the purpose of affecting either his competency or credibility."
The defendant did not testify in any judicial proceeding. His
capacity to testify was not assailed for he did not testify. He was
not questioned as a witness concerning his religious belief. He is
plainly not within the letter of the Act of 1909. Should the court
assume the right to extend the policy of the statute to cases not
within its terms on the supposition that, had the legislature had in
thought these cases, it would have so broadened the terms of the
statute, that they would have been embraced within them?
There are several tests for the truth of the testimony of living witnesses. They usually appear before the tribunal, and can be
observed while giving their testimony. They are affirmed or sworn,
and then subjected to the penalties of perjury if they depose falsely.
Formerly, witnesses were
They are exposed to cross-examination.
they believed in a
unless
swear,
could
none
and
swear,
to
obliged
God who would, either in this or a future life, punish falsehood.
The reverence and fear of the Divine Person were regarded as an
important sanction. Late legislation has abolished the neecssity
of swearing, and therefore, of entertaining the theological beliefs
which were the substratum of the oath, but, it has not dispensed with
the ,other tests of and motives to truthfulness.
May we safely infer that in abrogating for the living witness,
the policy which allowed inquiry into his religious belief, it probably
would have abrogated inquiry into the religious belief of a non-witness, who did not speak in the face of the court, who has gone beyond the punishments of perjury, and who cannot be tested by crossexamination?
The impression which the proximity of death, and of the giving
of an account to God, presumably made on the mind of the declarant, is one of the sanctions whose existence is chiefly dwelt ulvon
as justifying the acceptance of hearsay. Of dying declarations (Eyre,
C. B. remarked, in Woodcock's Cases, Leach Crim. L. 4 ed. 500), that
they were receivable because "they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the .point of death, and when every
hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is sienced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations
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to speak the truth; a situation so solemn and so awful is considered
by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is created by
a positive oath administered in a court of justice."
If the solemn and grandiose conceptions which the religious man
entertains do not exist, it is evident that a serious reduction of the
force of the guaranty that the dying man will tell the truth, must
take place. The declarant is responsible for falsehood to nobody;
not to God, for he does not believe in him; not to the state, for he is
passing beyond the state's power; not to the judgment of his fellow citizens, for their censure or applause can be neither a reward
nor a punishment to him.
The cases in which dying declarations are receivable are among
the gravest that appear before the courts; homicide cases, often
capital in kind. It is not wise to weaken the sanctions that the law
has heretofore insisted on to secure their truthfulness. At least
we do not deem it wise to lessen the force of these sanctions, by a
latitudinarian interpretation of a statute which in terms does not
extend to dying declarations.
An objection to inquiries into the theological opinion of living
witnesses, does not apply to inquiry into those of the dead. They
cannot be hurt by exposure to those who survive them, of their
theological heresies. On the contrary, among large numbers of
people, a man loses confidence and respect, if he is known to be an
atheist or even a disbeliever in a future state of punishment. Something could be said for a policy which shelters the living from
insolent inquisitions into their religious beliefs which would
be irrelevant with respect to the dead.
The learned court 'below has properly held that the bad reputation of the deceased for veracity may be proven to impair his
credit.

SANDER v. C. V. IL R.
Negligence-Common

Carrier-Defective

Construction

of

Axle

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sander, while a passenger on the C. V. R. R. was severely injured in an accident caused by a defective axle. The defect was one,
which the manufacturer, but not the C. V. R. R. could have discovered by tests in common use by car manufacturers.
Action for
damages.
Burke for plaintiff.
Farrell for defendant.
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OF THE COURT

ANDRE, J. At is contended by the learned counsel for the
plaintiff, "as 'soon as a passenger on a railroad is injured, there is a
presumption of negligence on the part of the railroad, which, to
relieve itself of liability, the latter must show did not exist." This
is held in, Thomas v. P. & R. R. R., 148 Pa. 180.
The case further holds that where a passenger is injured, either
by anything done or omitted by the carrier through its employees,
or anything connected with the appliances of transportation, the
burden of proof is upon the carrier to show that such injury was in
no way the result of its negligence; but to throw this .burden upon
the carrier, it must first be shown, that the injury complained of,
resulted from the breaking of machinery, or in the appliances of transportation. In the case at bar, the injury was caused
by a defect in an axle and, therefore, by a defect in the appliances
of transportation.
Since this is the case, the burden of proof rests upon the C. V.
R R. to show there was no negligence, and the facts of the case
very clearly brings this out, as will be shown below.
The counsel for the plaintiff further contends that the railroad
should make their own cars, and if they did so they would
be liable for any accidents caused by defects in the same; and should
they intrust this making of their cars to any other company or
manufacturer, they should be liable for any injuries resulting from
any defects in such cars, for it is their business to make their own
cars. This statement we refuse to accept as a good rule, or as on.
well founded in law, for if railroads were compelled to make their
own machinery and cars, their .business as railroading would not
receive the proper amount of care, in so much as they would have
to spend too much time in overseeing large steel plants and manufactories. Further, there would be entirely too much responsibility
thrust upon a railroad company to have produced, as are now produced, all of the excellent conveniences connected with railroad traffic.
The general custom of railroads is not to make all of the machinery which is necessary for the carrying on of their business. So
long as they buy necessary machinery from old and reliable firms,
that is all that is required to prove they were not negligent in that
respect. Grand Rapids and Indiana R. R. Co. v. Huntly, 33 Mich.
537.
A carrier of passengers is bound by law to make its cars as
This is a well
safe as human foresight and care can provide.
founded truth, and in the case at bar the C. V. R. R. have complied with this to its utmost power, for it is well stated, that the
defect in the said axle was such that no railroad inspector could de-
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tect, and even if the railroad had not had the exle tested, they would
have been no more liable than if they had, for such testing would
have been of no avail.
It was held in Meier v. P. & R. R. R. 64 Pa. 225, that, where an
accident arises from a hidden and internal defect, which a carefui and
thorough examination would not disclose and which could not be
guarded against by sound judgment, the carrier is not liable foc any
injury arising therefrom.
Wood, on Railroads, says: that the rule appears to be in this
country that a railroad company is not responsible for defects in
its vehicles, etc., which the manufacturers, through some scientific
tests might have discovered, but which they could not discover, using the most reasonable amount of care and diligence, in testing the
same. He cites as authority for this, Hegman v. Western R. R. Co. 13
N. Y. 9.
A railroad company is a carrier of passengers and not an insurer of the lives of those passengers which it carries against all
injuries. As soon as we try to compel the railroads to have perfectly safe modes of transportation, without a single defect, we are
trying to bring about the impossible. We are trying to compel to
be done, what is entirely unreasonable.
Should such be the case, all such companies, would have to have
a limitless supply of money in reserve, and numerous clerks employed to pay out money for all accidents, which bring injuries to
some of their passengers, whether it be the fault of the railroad
that the injuries occurred or not.
Such restrictions or compulsory laws would make a railroad
company the equal of a superhuman being, which could not be effected by even an act of God.
The case of Meier v. P. &. R .R. R. is one almost identically
like the one at bar and was decided in favor of the railroad.
Therefore, suming up the facts of the case at bar, the contentions of the learned counsels and regarding the law of Pennsylvania,
as applied in former cases, a verdict must be given for the defendant, the C. V. R. R.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The defendant is a common carrier. It does not insure the safety of its passengers. It insures them safety so far as injury to them
is preventible by its due care.
When an accident occurs, it is presumed, until it is explained,
to have been preventible by proper care. McCafferty v. R. R. Co.
193 Pa. 339; Spear v. P. W. & B. R. Co., 119 Pa. 61; Meier v. Pa. Pa. R.
R. Co., 61 Pa. 225; Fredericks v. N. C. R. R., 157 Pa. 103.
Due care, on the part of a Railroad Company, involves inspection of the cars, and other appliances with a view to the detec-
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tion of any defects. So far as appears, the R. R. Co. did inspect
the axle at a proper time, but failed to discover the defect in it,
which caused the accident. It appears that no test which the defendant could have applied, would have disclosed it. It appears that
tests, not possible of use, -by the Railroad Company, but in common
use by car manufacturers, would have been successful. We do not
know why the manufacturers' tests might not have been employed.
by the railroad corporation, but since the special verdict ascertains
that they could not have been, we are precluded from entertaining
a doubt thereupon.
Then the question presents itself whether it was negligence in
the corporation not to have employed a car manufacturer to make
the tests.
The answer to that question will in part turn on the question
whether it was negligence on the part of the defendant not to know
that the manufacturer might discover defects which it could not, and
whether, knowing this, it was its duty to call in the art of the man.factuer in order to make the tests.
The successful tests, it is ascertained, were "in common use by
car manufacturers." Should not the defendant then, have known
of their existence? A jury would, we think, properly have so found.
The undertaking to carry passengers imposes the duty of extreme
care -on the carrier and inquiry about practicable tests of states
of axles and wheels and other parts of cars, from any likely source of
information, is dictated by this care.
It is not practicable, perhaps, to call in a manufacturer of cars,
every hour, or every day, to examine the axles, but a jury would
probably find that a not too frequent periodic examination by the
manufacture should be resorted to, in order to lessen the chances of
accident from concealed inperfections of wheels and axles.
In Meier v. Penna. R. R. Co., 64 Pa. 225, it does not appear that
by tests in common use by car manufacturers, the defects in the axle
could have been discovered.
The facts ascertained by the jury are not sufficient to justify
the exoneration of the defendant, and the jury should have been so
instructed.
Reversed with v. f. d. n.
SOHN v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK
Negotiable Instruments-Relation of Bank to Depositor of Foreign
Check
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sohn, a customer of the First National Bank, deposited therein
a foreign check for $300. The Bank credited his account with the
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same. He then drew out his balance including the $300. The bank
sent the check through the mails for collection. Later it was discovered that the check had been lost in the mail and the bank charged Sohn's account with the $300. Sohn now sues the bank to recover the $300.
Shelly for plaintiff.
Shenton for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
LEOPOLD, J. The possibility of here holding the defendant
bank liable must necessarily depend upon the relation existing between the bank and its customer, the plaintiff, in this case.
Upon the conclusion of a very diligent search we find absolutely no precedent in Pennsylvania law by which we may be guided
in the rendering of this opinion.
'he conclusion reached in this opinion, has been the result of a
line of reasoning, supported by authorities, involving three main
points: (1) The relation established between the customer and the
Bank, upon the deposit of a foreign check. (2) The degree of care
required of the bank in maintaining this relationship. (3) Has the
defendant bank here maintained this degree of care, thus relieving
itself of liability?
We are of the opinion that upon Sohn's depositing this foreign
check with the bank, the bank became his agent. The fact that
the bank credited his account with the value of the check and that
Sohn subsequently drew -out this three hundred dollars does not
alter this relationship whatever. Credit was extended Sohn as a
matter of convenience to him. The bank gained nothing by so doing, in fact the bank lost the use of this money for the time. Credit
was given Sohn on the strength of his general balance warranting
the same. This is the universal practice among banks today. Quoting
from the opinion of a recent Pennsylvania decision, Hazlett v. Commercial Bank, 132 Pa. 118: "When the plaintiff deposited said check
with the defendant bank for collection, he made the latter bank his
agent. The mere fact that the collecting bank credited him with
the check as cash did not alter that relation. This is done dailyindeed it is almost universal usage to cedit such collections as cash
unless the customer making such deposit is in weak credit." This
doctrine is also supported by Ward v. Smith, 7 Wallace 451.
Had the check been unpaid, for any reason whatever, the
amount could have been charged back to Sohn's account, the bank
thereby assuming no liability whatever. Hazlett v. Bank, 132 Pa.
118; Rapp et al. v. Bank, 136 Pa. 426; Peterson v. Bank, 52 Pa. 206;
Savings Institution v. Folk, 38 Sup. 54; Girard Trust Co. v. Boyd,
45 Sup. 297; American and English Encyclopedia of Law, Vol. 3,
page 817.
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Quoting from Morse on Banks and Banking, Vol. 2, Sec. 586:
"Checks, like drafts, bills, or notes deposited with the bank are
placed for collection, and not sold, exchanged or otherwise made the
subject of a contract to transfer title. The fact that, owing to
the course that such paper has to run, these institutions usually
permit their customers to draw against the amount of the check,
does not, of itself, alter the relation between the parties. The depositor remains the owner of the paper and the bank merely the
agent." This doctrine is supported by Louisiana Ice Co. v. State
National Bank, 1 La. 185; Beale v. Somerville, 17 L. R. A. 291; Balback v. Frelinghuysen, 15 Fed. Rep. 675. It is therefore our opinion
that the contract here established was one of agency. The bank
did not purchase the check, it merely became Sohn's agent for collection.
Now, let us consider the liability of such an agent. In making
collections an agent is bound to use only due diligence. Lawrence
v. McCalmont et al. 2 (Howard) U. S. 426; 36 (Barb.) N . Y. 81;
Hazlett v. Bank, 132 Pa. 118.
Also quoting from the Ameican and English Encyclopedia, Vol.
3, page 805: "The acceptance of a contract to collect binds the bank
23
to the exercise of reasonable skill and ordinary diligence.
(Pick.) Mass. 330 Isham v. Post, 141 N. Y. 100.
Now, due diligence is that which persons of common prudence
are accustomed to use about their own business and affairs. Tiernan v. Comm. Bank, 7 (How.) Miss. 648.
It is an undisputed fact that this is the customary method employed by banks in handling collections. Therefore, if the bank
here has actually used the customary and reasonable method, it
is without fault. Dutcher v. Bank, 59 (How. Pr.) N. Y. Ct. of Appeals 10. This we think to be the case. Banks, ordinarily, send
their items through the mails. The defendant is consequently not
guilty of negligence in this respect.
We see no grounds whatever for holding the defendant bank liable in this case and we are supported by Michie on Banks and
Banking, Vol. 2, page 1484: "Where a bank, holding paper for collection, transmits the same to a correcpondent in the usual method it
would seem that it is not liable to the owner if such paper be lost Jacobson v. Belmont, 20 N. Y.
transmission through the mail."
Super. Ct. 14.
Therefore, the bank being Sohn's agent and not being guilty of
negligence, we see no reason whatever for holding the defendant
liable.
Judgment for defendant.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
A conflict of opinion exists as to whether the deposit of a foreign check in a bank (1) creates the relation of principal and agent
between the depositor and the bank, or (2) constitutes a sale of the
check to the bank, creating between the bank and the depositor the
relationship of debtor and creditor.
In Pennsylvania it is held (1) that such deposit creates, presumably, the relation of principal and agent; (2) that the fact that
the bank credits the depositor with .the amount of the check does
not change the character of the transaction; (3) that the fact that
the depositor is permitted to draw against the deposit at once does
riot change the nature of the transaction. Nat. Bank v. Bonsor, 38
Super. 275; Rapp v. National Bank, 138 Pa. 426; Hazlett v. Bank,
132 Pa. 118.
The bank being merely an agent, cannot be charged with the
amount of the check, unless it was negligent in the performance
of its duties. There is no evidence of negligence on the part of
the bank in this case. Using the mail to transmit the check was
not negligence. The right to use the mails for such a purpose is
tacitly assumed to exist in many cases. See e. g. Warner v. Crook,
167 Pa. 259; Har. Law Review, Dec., 1914, 205.
Judgment affirmed.
COMMONWEALTH v. BROWN
Assault and Battery-Corporal Punishment by Parent Upon Child
Garrahan, for defendant.
Miller, for commonwealth.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SHELLY, J. The facts of this case are substantially as follows, Brown was indicted for assault and battery. He had punished his child for playing truant. The jury brought in a special
verdict in which they stated that the corporal punishment inflicted
upon the child was unreasonably severe, but it was administered
with good intentions. The court sentenced Brown.
The law of Pennsylvania on this subject seems to be somewhat
doubtful. From the brieis of the counsel in the present case and
from the cases cited to support the various positions, we draw the
conclusion that the law in this state, as far as it has gone, maintains that, the parent can administer punishment to his child, regardless of mildness or severity, so long as he does it with good
motives, and does not permanently injure it.
The amount of punishment to be administered is, therefore,
optional with the parent and as cited by the briefs, parents in one
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instance will think a certain amount of correction necessary and
others will be of the opinion that more or less is required. We can
easily see from this common example how difficult it would be to
have one established rule to govern all cases presented and consequently we must have a flexible rule that covers the rudiments of
the case and leaves the facts, peculiar to that case, to be decided
by the jury.
With the advance of civilization and the late acts of legistion on the care of the child, we see what a tendency it has to carry
us away from the corporal punishment. If the law is to assist in
this advance, it cannot allow unreasonable punishment to be inflicted
upon the prospective citizens of our Commonwealth. Should it allow such punishment, instead of being of assistance it would be a
drawback. Consistent with this idea of advancement, the law says
that a parent can administer punishment, so long as it is reasonable
and the paent has good intentions and not a malo animo.
The importance of the law, and likewise the questions to be
decided here are, What is reasonable punishment? and how are the
good, we are unable to see how the punishment which follows can
be said to be unreasonable, provided of course, the good motives remain throughout; and if they so remain with the parent, how can
hc administer punishment which will cause great suffering" or bodily harm? How are we to dispose of the parental love which is supposed to exist between the parent and the child?
The better view, we think, would be that where the punishment
is unreasonable, the good motives of the parent Would be presumed
to be non-existent. As these good motives are wholly within the
mind of the parent and are not capable of being ascertained by any
act, the defense is easily set up that the punishment was inflicted
with good motives, and how would it better be shown that no good
motives existed than by the unreasonableness of the punishment.
A very poor law, indeed, it would be that would forbid an act
and then put it within the power of the defendant to excuse himself
on the ground of "good motives." Intentions do not count anything
as a defense in the criminal law in other branches and why should
they do so in this one?
There are times when corporal punishment is necessary and at
such times it is also necessary that it be restricted to a humane
degree, otherwise the amount of damage done would far outweigh
the good intended to be derived from the situation.
The lower court, therefore, did not err in sentencing the, defendant on the special verdict, which found good motives but unreasonable corporal punishment. The unreasonable punishment was
a fact, the good motives a mere presumption on the part of the jury.
If the good motives had been proved beyond - reasonable doubt,
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the jury would have undoubtedly acquitted the defendant, and therefore the lower court is affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The question presented is whether a father who with good
motives inflicts upon this son corporal punishment which twelve
of his neighbors who happen to be serving on the jury think is unreasonably severe, is criminally liable for an assault and battery.
It is quite true that in many cases the unreasonableness of the
punishment would give rise to the presumption that it was not inflicted with good motives, 'but in the present case we are not permitted to act upon this presumption because the jury has found
specifically that the defendant acted with good motives.
The authorities are in conflict. In S. v. Henkle, 127 Ind. 490,
it is said: "The law has wisely left it to the court or jury trying
the cause to determine whether the chastisement is reasonable and
lawful or unreasonable and unlawful." The same doctrine is asserted
in other cases. See Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509; Johnson v. S.,
2 Hump. (Tenn.) 283; Neal v. S., 54 Ga. 281. In support of this
rule the court said: "Parents who bring children into the world owe
to them and the community the duty of caring for and training
them in infancy and curbing their evil tendencies at a time and at
an age when it can be done without resorting to excessive punishment and brutal and inhuman treatment and if the parent neglects
the proper training of a child and permits it to go unrestrained until its vicious habits are so fixed as not to yield to reasonable chastisement, it is his duty to adopt some other method for the reformation of his child other than brute force and abuse." S. v. Hinkle, (Supra). Tho this reasoning is far from being clear and centainly is not convincing, it must be admitted that the doctrine of
the cases cited accords with the theory of those cases which hold
that for the purpose of determining criminal responsibility the defendant's conduct should be judged by the standard of an average
reasonable man and not by his own standard. See C. v. Pierce, 138
Mass. 165.
On the other hand, it has been held that the parent is the sole
judge of the necessity for the exercise of the disciplinary right and
of the nature and character of the correction to be given, and the
mere fact that a castigation he gives the child may appear to others
to be unnecessarily harsh or severe does not make his conduct a
subject of judicial cognizance." "The extent of the punishment to
be applied is wisely left to the judgment of the parent." S. v.
Koonse, 123 Me. Ap. 655. The same doctrine is asserted in Dean
v. S., 89 Ala. 46, where it is said: "The parent is not liable in all
cases merely because in the opinion of the jury, the punishment inflicted is immoderate or excessive. More than this isnecessary to
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fasten upc'n him criminality. He must not only inflict the child
inunoderate punishment but he must do so animo malo or else he
must inflict some permanent injury." To the same effect are: S. v.
Jones, 95 N. C. 588; Boyd v. S., 88 Ala. 169; P. v. Green, 155 Mich.
216. This doctrine is approved by the text writers, Spencer 441,
Reeves 357-358, Bishop 882, Tiffany 264. The reasons advanced in
support of this doctrine are: "Courts do not and should not constitute themselves arbiters of the household; the law has provided
no means whereby a parent meditating chastisement can first obtain a judicial opinion as to its due extent; the natural love of the
parent will provide an efficient barrier against an impulse to punishment with undue severity.
See cases cited supra. In S. v.
Jones, 95 Ni. C. 588, it is said: "It would be a dangerous innovation
fruitful in mischief if ...... it were left to the jury to detern-ne in
each case whether a chastisement was excessive and to convict when
such was their opinion."
The conflict of opinion prevailing elsewhere is reflected in the
Pennsylvania cases.
In C. v. BlAker, 1 Brew. 311, it was
held that a father who inflicts unreasonable punishment upon his
child may be convicted of assault and battery. On the other hand,
in C. v. Seeds, 5 Clark. 78, it is said: "To render a parent liable to
prosecution, he must be governed by motives of malice and wickedness. For a mere error of judgment influenced, perhaps, by
fond parental love for the future prosperity and happiness of the
child, he cannot be held legally liable. The law does not permit a
court to invade the sanctuary of the domestic circle and usurp parental authority in every family because we may think the punishment
is severe."
We adopt the view of the latter case. It is true that, as suggested by the learned court below, it is difficult to determine with
precision what was a man's motive for any given act, but this difficulty is no greater than that of applying the standard of a "reasonable man." This man, who is made the standard by the learned
court below has no real existence. The "reasonable man" cannot
be pictured in the mind as a concrete individual. The mind of the
average juror is unable to comprehend this legal phantom who never
makes a mistake and consequently in applying this standard each
juror consciously, subconsciously, or unconsciously, tests the acts
under consideration by asking himself what he would have done under the same circumstances. The tests applied are as "variable as
the foot of each juror" and the decision of the case rests, not upon
a finding as to what the ideal man would have done, but what the
juors would have done. The "reasonable man" thus becomes any
man outside of an asylum who happens to be serving on the jury.
The reason which the courts have given for not applying such a
standard in a case like the present are sufficiently cogent to influence the reversal of the judgment.
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BOOK REVIEW
The Law of Arrest in Civil and Criminal Actions, by Harvey
Cortlandt Voorhees, of the Boston Bar. Second Edition, Little,
Brown & Co., 1915.
The first edition of this little book appeared in 1904. It has
become well known, in fact a vade mecum for police officers, and
the officers of the police departments "wherever English and American law forms the basis of jurisprudence." The various chapters
deal with the right of personal liberty, the issue and service of
process, the officer who may issue it; what constitutes an arrest;
the warrant; when a warrant is, when it is not necessary; breaking
doors in making the arrest; the use of force in making it; arrest
in extradition proceedings; evidence to establish the offence, exemption from arrest; false imprisonment, and trespass. One chapter is devoted to forms. A good index concludes the book.

